AD NUMBER

AD900653

LIMITATION CHANGES

TO:

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

FROM:

Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't. agencies only; Test and Evaluation; 23 MAY 1972. Other requests shall be referred to Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development (ARMY), Washington, DC 20310.

AUTHORITY

AGO per ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO

DAAG-PAP-A (M) (9 Jun 72) DAFD-OTT – 712148

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 577th Engineer Battalion (Const), Period Ending 31 October 1971

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. The attached report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15.

2. The information contained in this report is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: DAFD-OTT, within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

VERNE L. BOWERS
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Incl
as

DISTRIBUTION:
Commanding Generals
US Continental Army Command
US Army Combat Developments Command
US Army Materiel Command
Commandant, US Army Engineer School

Copies furnished:
Office, Chief of Staff, US Army (DWSA)
Deputy Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Research and Development
Assistant Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Engineers
The Provost Marshal General
(Distribution Cont'd)

COPY

003 650

DISCLAIMER NOTICE



THIS DOCUMENT IS BEST QUALITY AVAILABLE. THE COPY FURNISHED TO DTIC CONTAINED A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF PAGES WHICH DO NOT REPRODUCE LEGIBLY.

DISTRIBUTION (Cont'd)
Commanders in Chief
  US Army, Europe
  US Readiness Command
Commanding General, US Army, Alaska
Commander, US Army Forces Southern Command
Commandant of the Marine Corps
Defense Documentation Center
Commanding Officers
  US Army Construction Engineering Research Laboratory
  US Army Land Warfare Laboratory
  US Army Logistics Doctrine, Systems & Readiness Agency
  US Army Mobility Equipment Research & Development Center



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 577th ENGINEER BATTALION (CONST)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96204

EGAB-1 1 November 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 577th Engineer Battalion (Const), Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R3)

THRU: 35th Engineer Group (Const)
CG GRARENGRCOMDV, ATTN: AVCC-MO
CG GSARV; ATTN: AVHDO-DO
CG USARPAC, ATTN: GPO-DT

TO: HQDA (DAFD-ZA), Washington, D.C. 20310

1. OPERATIONS: Significant Activities

a. Command:

(1) General; During this reporting period the battalion had Bravo and Charlie Companies stationed at Duc Tron constructing QL-20W, HHC, Alpha, and Delta Companies were at Dong Duong constructing QL-11 (Goodview Pass). The battalion was functionally reorganized with Company B the vertical unit. The battalion began and completed its draw down during October with Company B in support of the 815th Engineer Battalion and relocated to Dillard IWS.

(2) Mission: The primary mission of the battalion at the beginning of the period was the construction of QL-20W from the junction with QL-21B to bridge 22 and the construction of QL-11 from Don Duong to Song Pha. This Mission was modified several times and at the end of the period the mission was to support the 61st ARVN Engineer Battalion with asphalt, concrete, and base course.

(3) Commanders and Principle Staff:

Battalion Commander	LTC Richard A. Kitts
Executive Officer	NONE
S1 Officer	CPT Henry P. Love
S2 Officer	1LT Daniel L. Conner
S3 Officer	CPT James A. Skarot
S4 Officer	CPT Warren A. Deslatte
RHC Commander	CPT Kenneth J. D. Hurst
A Co. Commander	CPT Dennis W. Marrin
B Co. Commander	CPT Glenn Struges
C Co. Commander	NONE
D Co. Commander	CPT Ronald A. Shively

DAFD-OTT
712148
Incl

b. Administration:

(1) Strength:

577th Engineer Battalion (Const)

	Auth	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	New Auth	Oct
O	31	33	32	23	23	23	15	8
W	7	6	5	6	5	7	2	3
E	636	472	486	477	409	350	235	63

51st ASPHALT PLATOON

	Auth	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	New Auth	Oct
O	1	0	1	1	2	1	0	0
W	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
E	31	23	19	23	32	30	0	0

(2) Awards: Bronze Star 25
ARCOM 42
Good Conduct 0

(3) Discipline: Article 15's 39
Court Martials 1

c. Construction Operations:

(1) Alpha Company: During the reporting period, Company A operated the asphalt plant, rock crushers, paving train, and during the month of September took over all pothole and asphalt road repair responsibility. Company A was also augmented with the necessary tools, equipment, and personnel needed to accomplish the work on QL-11S (Goodview Pass). 15,744 tons of asphalt were produced. A total of 5.1 KM of double lane and 1.2 KM of single lane were paved on QL-11S. A total of .150 KM of double lane and 2.0 KM of shoulders were paved on QL-20W. The Don Duong Industrial Site produced a total of 29,112 CY of 3"(-) rock, 9,466 CY of 7/8"(-) rock and 10,218 CY of 3/8"(-) rock. A total of 12,271

CY of 3" (-) rock was produced at the Tung Nghia Quarry Site. The crushing operation at Tung Nghia was stopped during the period 12-19 July 1971 and the 75 TPH primary crusher was relocated back to Don Duong. During the month of September the 61st ARVN Engineer Battaion began work on QL-20W and was supported by truck haul of 2,319 CY of base course from Dong Duong to QL-20W. In October all of the battalion operations were taken over by Company A allowing the other companies to concentrate exclusively on draw down. All of the Goodview Pass was completed including the city streets of Song Pha. Also bridge QL-11/49 was completed.

(2) Bravo Company: During the reporting period Company B was functionally organized as a company composed of horizontal platoons from Companies B and C. Basic earthwork was concentrated on QL-20W where 2.0 KM of sub-grade, 4.3 KM of sub-base, and 1.9 KM of base course were placed and compacted. Basic earthwork also was accomplished on bridges QL-20/24, 26, and 27 where approaches were backfilled and compacted. A bypass was also constructed at bridge QL-20/26 and an existing bypass at bridge QL-20/24 was upgraded. During the period 13-19 August 1971, Company B was relocated to Di Linn and was attached to the 815th Engineer Battalion.

(3) Charlie Company; During the reporting period Company C was functionally organized as a vertical construction company consisting of the vertical platoons of Companies B and C. Vertical effort was concentrated on drainage structures on QL-20W and construction of bridges QL-20/24, 26, and 27. QL-20/26 consisted of constructing the east half of the bridge. The weat half had been completed by Company B during the previous period. Work on QL-20/27 consisted of placing deck slabs, guard posts and handrails, and concrete approach slabs. An 8' x 4' x 60' concrete box culvert and a reinforced concrete headwall were also constructed. The culverts were of 36" and 48" diameter. Two twin 24" access culverts with rock and stone headwalls were also placed on QL-20. During the period 6-11 September 1971 Company C relocated to the Don Duong compound and also supported the move of the Duc Trong LSA to the Don Duong compound by constructing a 40' x 100' dry storage shelter and other facilities. Company C also took over all work on bridge QL-11/29. Work consisted of removing the old bridge and excavating for piers and abutments. Piles were driven with the support of the 497th Engineer Company (RC). Piers and abutments were formed and poured. Steel stringers were set and pre-cast deck panel were place and welded. Sidewalk panels were pre-cast and placed, and guard posts were poured with pipe handrails in place. Both approach slabs were formed and poured, and the approaches were prepared and paved.

(4) Delta Company: During the reporting period Company D concentrated its construction effort on QL-11S (Goodview Pass). 25.9 KM were completed and turned over to DGOH. Major effort consisted of preparing 6.3 KM for paving or over paving. Numerous erosions, shoulder, and edge failures were stabalized with

asphaltic concrete and ditches subject to high velocity flow and erosion were also lined with rock and sealed with asphaltic concrete. Numerous rock and mortar headwalls and retaining walls were repaired. Major earth work effort was expended from station 42+200 to station 42+350 in removing 40,000 CY of material to backslope and realign the roadway. A blast rock stabilized subgrade was prepared and base course was placed and compacted for paving. A 60" culvert was placed and a rock and mortar drop inlet and headwall were constructed. From station 43+000 to station 49+600. 100,000 CY of earth bank cuts were completed and 600 meters of roadway was widened. Three existing culverts were re-opened and new headwall were constructed. From station 51+700 to station 51+850 a section of the road was rebuilt and one new culvert headwall was constructed. Heavy monsoon rains continued to pose erosion and road failure problems at various sections of the roadway including sections of the road turned over to DGOH. Continuous maintenance effort was required to keep QL-11 open for traffic. Work neared completion on approaches to bridge QL-11/52 which consisted of building up and paving 150 meters of roadway and ever paving the bridge. The drainage system along QL-11 in Don Duong was upgrade and 400 meters of shoulder were rebuilt and drainage ditches were rede fined. 18" and 36" culverts were installed at various locations to provide adequate subsurface and cross drainage.

d. Combat Support Operations: None.

e. Intelligence: None.

f. Communications: None.

g. Medical:

(1) Health of Command: During the reporting period the general health of the personnel of this command was excellent. Daily non-effectiveness and morbidity remained at a low level during the entire period of time. We experienced five cases of infectious hepatitis and two cases of malaria. There were no cases of pneumonia but ten men sustained injuries in vehicle accidents. During the month of August 1971, one man was severely burned and he subsequently expired after being evacuated to the States. No animal bites or scratches were reported among military personnel.

(2) Trends: During the six month span there was an average of three man-days lost per 1000 men per day due to illness or injury. No significant trends were established in any of the various categories of diseases. Venereal disease has not posed a serious threat to our troops in the previous six months. The incidence of all types of venereal diseases has been maintained at rather low levels primarily because of a program which has involved the frequent administration of prophylactic penicillin to a large number of the local prostitutes.

DGAB-1
SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned, 577th Engineer Battalion (Const), Period Ending 31 Oct 71, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R3).

(3) Problem Areas and Recommendations: Preventive medicine measures have been stringently emphasized during the period. The specific areas in which good results have been obtained are the following: mess sanitation, water treatment, malaria chemoprophylaxis, insect control (mainly by spraying), rodent control, immunizations, and personal protective measures against common infectious diseases, malaria, and venereal disease. The prevalence of drug abuse is considerably lower at present than it was six months ago. There are no statistics to support this contention, but this conclusion has been drawn primarily because of the following reasons: fewer men have sought medical assistance for drug related problems or withdrawal; fewer incidents have occurred as a direct result of drug abuse; and, the separate companies have reported fewer disciplinary problems stemming from the use of drugs.

h. Religious Activities: Normal religious activities continued for the Catholics, Protestant, Church of Christ, and Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints. Weekly classes were conducted for Mormons as well as a general bible study and devotion group. The Chaplain conducted a discussion group for drug users resulting in 16 voluntary rehabilitation cases at Cam Ranh Bay. In addition the Chaplain was active with the local Vietnamese religious groups and on numerous occations hosted visits. Church attendence has increased 51% over this reporting period.

i. Civic Action: Civic action during this period was basically characterized by heavy equipment support and rock/gravel supply to surrounding villages, schools, and orphanages. The significant projects were: completion of the Don Duong market place; the paving of Don Duong streets; and, the construction support (landscaping and supply) of several buildings at the various local orphanages and schools.

j. PIO: During the reporting period the PIO provided the following: monthly coverage in the Engineer Command newspaper, THE CASTLE COURIER; full page article in the Fall issue of the KYSU, the Engineer Command magazine; and, monthly hometown local news releases on men assigned to this unit.

k. Safety: In addition to the normal safety hazards associated with an industrial site, this unit had the task of working daily on a mountain pass. To cope with the mountain driving, defensive driving methods were frequently taught and consistently stressed. In the industrial site, personnel were often queried for safety improvements. These were evaluated and implemented if appropriate. Daily checks of equipment safety devices were conducted and repairs made as required. The success of this unit's safety program is reflected by the total lack of any serious industrial accidents during this reporting period.

l. Logistics: None.

m. Maintenance: During the reporting period this unit operated an effective maintenance program which enabled the battalion to accomplish its mission. A TOE maintenance configuration was employed during the stated period. This organization, coupled with proper management, capably served the maintenance needs of the battalion. The success of the program can be traced to the excellent cooperation among first, second, and third levels of maintenance. The impact of maintenance upon the battalion's mission can best be seen through a list of work accomplished by the Direct Support Unit and the Tech Supply sections which provide readily available records.

(1) DSU Work Accomplished.

(a) Ordnance Section:

ITEMS REPAIRED	JOB ORDERS COMPLETED	*ADJUSTED
Engines	38	
Transmissions	24	
Clutches	31	
Transfers	9	
Axle Assemblies	11	
Miscellaneous	135	
TOTALS	248	248

(b) Engineer Section:

Engines	30	
Transmissions	8	
Clutches	9	
Transfers	3	
Toggle Plate	1	
Miscellaneous	208	
TOTALS	259	300

(c) Machine Shop:

Miscellaneous	136	
TOTALS	136	2000

(d) Welding Shop:

Miscellaneous	42	
TOTAL	42	65
GRAND TOTAL	685	2613

* The adjusted figures represent the estimated number of jobs actually completed for which job orders were never filled out due to the urgency of the mission. Emergency work on the asphalt plant and rock crushers are the main reason for the adjusted figures.

(2) Tech Supply Data.

MONTH	REQUISITIONS SUBMITTED	EQUIPMENT TURNED IN
May	1257	135
June	1306	12
July	1030	32
August	546	34
September	750	39
October	711	29
TOTALS	6100	281

NOTE: Items stocked included 4217 / SL items and 2018 fringe items.

2. Lessons Learned: Commanders Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations

a. Personnel:

(1) Shortage of Skilled Personnel.

(a) OBSERVATION: Under a functionalized organization, the unit structure differs from the TOE structure. Due to our functionalized organization an imbalance between vertical and horizontal skill requirements existed. As a result of this imbalance each units personnel requirements were restructured to coincide with the assigned mission of that unit. This required extensive OJT of untrained personnel. The retraining of these personnel effects personnel actions such as promotions and the development of vertical or horizontal skills for progressively higher grade levels.

(b) EVALUATION: The imbalance between TOE and functionalized structure required to complete the mission could not be adequately solved at the unit

level since the personnel requitioning base was not in consonance with mission requirements.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: None.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: None.

(2) Shortages in Specialist MOS's.

(a) OBSERVATION: Many shortages exist in specialist MOS's (ie. truck drivers, equipment operators, electricians, and mechanics).

(b) EVALUATION: Personnel with MOS's alien to the engineers are being used to fill specialists slots. An OJT program would not be effective since this unit does not have sufficient assets to institute this type of program and still maintain mission essential operations.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: Special consideration should be given to the unit's overall mission when assigning replacement personnel.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Higher headquarters was informed of the above situation and OJT in essential areas was carried out minimizing as much as possible the adverse impact on mission operation.

(3) Personnel Actions.

(a) OBSERVATION: During and following the reorganization of the battalion, problems were observed in mail routing, payroll, and the increased number of orders and morning report entries required.

(b) EVALUATION: The TOE structure is not adaptable to rapid realignment of platoons and/or personnel between line companies (the basic method used). The effects were largely offset by careful planning, but problems still developed.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: That prior to functional reorganization personnel actions (morning reports, orders, etc.) be consolidated at the battalion level so that personnel management can be concentrated at that level, rather than at the company level.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: None.

b. Intelligence: None

EGAB-1
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 577th Engineer Battalion (Const), Period Ending 31 Oct 71, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R3).

c. Operations:

(1) Weather.

(a) OBSERVATION: Many valuable man and equipment hours are wasted when proper wet weather construction practices are not adhered to.

(b) EVALUATION: Although rains cannot always be accurately predicted there is a great deal of consistency in weather patterns. Proper sealing of road surfaces will greatly reduce rain damage when applied prior to rainfall.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: That during the monsoon season, planning be made to have bulk amounts of dry fill or base course on hand at the job site to expedite laydown, and asphalt distributor or trucks of asphaltic cement on hand immediately following laydown and compaction to insure a proper seal of the surface prior to rainfall. Only that amount of fill or base material should be layed down that can be properly sealed.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: This unit has implemented the above recommendation.

(2) Potholes on Goodview Pass.

(a) OBSERVATION: Wet weather caused major delays in essential progress on upgrading and repair work on the Goodview Pass.

(b) EVALUATION: Although rain is damaging to normal base repair in potholes it does not affect quality of repair work if a cement stabilized base is applied or if the old base is removed and replaced by reinforced concrete. This accepted technique of pothole repair enables work to continue on potholes during wet weather. The entire pothole maybe filled with concrete or cement stabilized base maybe brought to base course grade and asphalt applied to pavement depth at a later date with precautions being taken to preserve the existing asphalt edge. Welded wire fabric reinforcement of portland cement and asphaltic concrete proved to be an effective constuction technique for pothole repair.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That during wet weather, concrete be used for all potholing insuring however, that proper steel reinforcement is used to give tensile strength.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: This unit has implemented the above recommendation enabling it to meet established construction schedules regardless of the wet weather.

(3) Electrical Distribution System at Industrial Site

(a) OBSERVATION: Many problems with a 15 KW Generator supplying electricity to the asphalt plant and 10 KW generator providing electricity for security lighting have been experienced at critical times. A 500 KW generator supports the 75 TPH and 250 TPE rock crusher and is not louded to minimum recommended levels.

(b) EVALUATION: Although different voltages and frequencies are required to run the various Electrical systems at the industrial site, proper transformers could be installed at each major distribution point with connecting wires to the 500 KW generator enabling the entire industrial site to run off a centralized power source. One set of standard repair parts could then be stocked reducing maintenance man hours on small generators as well as the rest of the industrial site could be established. Existing small individual power sources could then be instituted as emergency backup of the various individual elements of the site.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: That the above described system be put into effect by ordering, receiving, and installing additional electrical poles, wiring, transformers, and switch boxes necessary to operate the entire industrial site off the 500 KW generator.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: An electrical survey has been conducted and additional materials have been ordered. Power poles have been installed to run wire from 500 KW generators to the asphalt plant and Dyna maintenance facility.

d. Organization

(1) Consolidation of Maintenance Management

(a) OBSERVATION: Better management of maintenance assets resulted when the DS maintenance function was absorbed by the battalion maintenance officer.

(b) EVALUATION: Rather than assigning DS maintenance to A Company commander as one of several missions, advantages occurred when the function was married to battalion maintenance section. More knowledge and intense management was applied to 3rd shop activities than was possible before reorganization.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: That this plan of organization be considered wherever battalion reorganization is planned.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: This unit has adopted above recommendation.

(2) Management Structure

(a) OBSERVATION: Upon reorganization it was deemed desireable to consolidate haul assets into the equivalent of a dump truck company, so that more effective management might be brought to bear on these resources. However, due to the necessity for retention of 3 construction management structures because of the 2 separate and distinct construction locations, and the lack of a dump truck or construction support company management structure that could have been utilized for this purpose, this could not be accomplished.

(b) EVALUATION: Dump truck assets were consolidated, as much as possible under the A Company structure. Full advantages of functionalization was not obtainable due to the lack of management structures to accommodate desired reorganization and distances between D and B Company work sites.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: Reorganization plans must account for desireable and obtainable management structures in light of mission requirements. Sufficient management structures must be built into a reorganized unit to accomodate these requirements and permit an effective span of control to exist.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: None

(3) Type Unit and Adaptability to Functionalization

(a) OVSERVATION: The 577th Engr Bn is a type B unit and has required heavy augmentation of work force by local nationals to meet production requirements. These LN employees are hired and transported to work from local areas. They consist of a mix of vertical and horizontal skills, but unlike their US counterparts, they connot be relocated to new unit when reorganization occurs. It was observed during reorganization when horizontal assets were shifted to Duc Trong that necessary LN operators could not accompany the equipment. Renewed recruiting and training near Duc Trong was necessary, with resultant production loss and inefficiency.

(b) EVALUATION: The type B unit augmented by local national work force is less adaptable to funotionalization, depending on the diversity and location of missions.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: None

(d) COMMAND ACTION: None

(4) Space Limitations

(a) OBSERVATIONS: It was noted during the planning for reorganization that existing cantonment facilities required to achieve full reorganization were not adequate.

(b) EVALUATION: The massing of all earthmoving assets to one area required larger motor pool area, larger facilities, and more billeting than was available. The shift of personnel and equipment, in general, required reorientation of facilities in both base camps to accommodate a new organization. This viewed as a constraint to reorganization and subsequently limited TOE desired shift of assets.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: None

(d) COMMAND ACTION: None

e. Training

(1) Lack of Trained Personnel

(a) OVSERVATION: Personnel assigned to this unit with only one specialty MOS and shortage of specialist MOS's as stated in 2.a. caused a lack of trained mission essential personnel.

(b) EVALUATION: Cross training of personnel has become a necessity with equipment operators and truck drivers. All operators and driver should be able to operate more than one type of equipment.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: To preclude a critical work stoppage caused by a lack of specialized personnel, and extensive continuous training program is necessary within each unit.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Cross training programs were and are in effect.

f. Logistics

(1) Flow of Materials

(a) OBSERVATION: The flow of material requests, issue, transport, and accountability became simpler after reorganization.

(b) EVALUATION: Material flow became more clear-cut when nearly all vertical construction materials were requested by, issued to, and controlled by the vertical construction company. In addition, repair parts stockage was simplified when each PLL line was kept in, predominantly only one company. Duplication of effort was avoided and the entire requisitioning and control procedure was simplified.

AVECA-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned, 577th Engineer Battalion (Const), Period Ending 31 Oct 71, RCS CSFOR .. 65 (R3).

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: None

(d) COMMAND ACTION: None

g. Communications: None

h. Materials

(1) Red Ball Requisitions

(a) OBSERVATIONS: Red Ball LOC support was unsatisfactory.

(b) EVALUATION: Red Ball requisitions submitted from this unit take 48 hours or more to reach CRP. Obtaining status of requisitions take normally 8 - 12 days. Time delay experienced for parts under Red Ball LOC criteria is too great.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: That Red Ball LOC program be revamped as necessary to provide realistic support.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: LMC and GMO have been coordinating to try improve the program.

FOR THE COMMANDER

HENRY P. LOVE
CPT, AGC
Adjutant

AVEGA-C (1 November 1971) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report——Lessons Learned of the 577th Engineer Battalion (Construction), Period Engine 31 October 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 35TH ENGINEER GROUP (CONSTRUCTION), APO 96312 16 Nov 1971

Commanding General, United States Army Engineer Command, Vietnam
ATTN: AVCC-MO, APO 96491

This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 October 1971 from the 577th Engineer Battalion (Construction) and concurs with the comments and observations of the Commander, with the following exceptions:

a. Reference para 2c 3.

(1) Using the 500 kw MAC/PC generator could solve the maintenance problems inherent in multiple generation usage in an IWS. However, a better established training and maintenance program on TO&E generators would be preferable in that when the crusher lines are not operating, power is generated by much smaller equipment.

b. Reference para 2d 1.

(1) Assigning the Battalion Maintenance officer the responsibility of the A Co DSU would depend upon the ability and experience of the individual holding the position. Many officers would find themselves overburdened and unable to support adequately the rest of the companies and to keep the Battalion Commander informed of the maintenance status, his primary duties.

(2) The Maintenance Platoon Leader, MOS 4815, has the TO&E task to supervise the DSU. Since A Co is the Maintenance and Equipment Support Company for the Battalion, the company commander should possibly have MOS 4815 to provide more maintenance experience in the supervisory element.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

GEORGE C. BOOHAKER
1LT, CE
Adjutant

AVCC-MO (1 Nov 71) 2nd Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 577th Engineer Battalion (Construction), Period Ending 31 Oct 71, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3).

HQ, U. S. Army Engineer Command, Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96491

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHDO-DO, APO San Francisco 96375.

1. The significant activities and lessons learned have been reviewed and are an adequate reflection of the unit's operation during the period.

2. Reference item concerning "Shortage of Skilled Personnel", page 7, para 2a (1). Concur. The solution to the discrepancy between authorized MOS structure and temporary mission requirements lies within the capability and authority of the Group Headquarters. The Group Headquarters can authorize temporary overstrengths in required MOS's within the group's total authorization. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

3. Reference item concerning "Personnel Actions", page 8, para 2a (3). Concur. Battalion CO has authority to centralize preparation of daily reports and other personnel actions within his section. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

4. Reference item concerning "Electrical Distribution System at Industrial Site", page 10, para 2c (3). Concur, except each individual situation should be evaluated. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

5. Reference item concerning "Consolidation of Maintenance Management", page 10, para 2d (1). Concur. This recommendation is worthy of consideration by each engineer construction battalion on a case-by-case basis. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

6. Reference item concerning "Red Ball Requisitions", page 13, para 2h (1). Nonconcur. The problem has been primarily one of unit isolation. The red ball LOC program is organized to provide status within 5-7 days from receipt of requisition. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

D. Y. FREED
CPT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

2 FEB 1972

AVHDO-DO (1 Nov 71) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned, 577th Engineer Battalion (Const), Priod Ending 31 Oct 71, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R3).

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-FD, APO 96558

This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 October 1971 from Headquarters, 577th Engineer Battalion and concurs with comments of indorsing headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

T. L. CHILDRESS
CPT AGC
ASSISTANT ADJUTANT GENERAL

Cy furn:
USARENGRCOMDV
577th Engr Bn

GPOP-FD (1 Nov 71) 4th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, HQ 577th Engineer Battalion (Const), Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 8 MAR 1972

TO: HQDA (DAFD-ZA) WASH DC 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

M. L. MAH
1LT, AGC
Asst AG

UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D

(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)

1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author) HQ DA, DAFD , Washington, D.C. 20310	2a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED 2b. GROUP

3. REPORT TITLE

Operational Report - Lessons Learned Hqs., 577th Engineer Battalion (Const), Period Ending 31 October 71 (U)

4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations

5. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name)

CO, 577th Engineer Battalion (Const)

6. REPORT DATE 22 May 1972	7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES 20	7b. NO. OF REFS
8a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO. b. PROJECT NO. c. N/A d.	9a. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S) 712148 9b. OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report)	

10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES N/A	12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY DA, DAFD Washington, D.C. 20310

13. ABSTRACT

DD FORM 1 NOV 68 1473

UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification